Introduction
Is it lawful to steal when you are in a condition of extreme need? For instance, is it lawful to steal to feed your family? This question appeared many times in the theological and juridical texts between the 12th and 15th centuries. As a case in point, Peter of Blois spoke about the case of a very poor man tortured by hunger and nudity. His wife and his children are dying before his very eyes: unless he steals something, they will certainly die in a short time.
He decides to steal something small, choosing to risk his life rather than suffer the unbearable torture of hunger and seeing his family meet with certain death. However, he's caught in the act and, as a result, is condemned to death. The judges did not consider either the misery of the poor man, nor the urgency and necessity that prompted him to steal. Do they believe themselves more righteous than God? The Law of Moses in fact provides for the punishment of the theft with a fine, while civil law itself knows how to distinguish the severity of the different types of theft (Peter of Blois, 1861). like deer, fallow deer, hares enjoy the privilege of great freedom. The beasts can devastate the fields and the gardens of the poor, and no one moves to prevent it.
In fact, in our day a sinister law condemns people not just for the capture of animals, but also for the mere suspicion of wanting to capture them. The members that nature has created for the procreation of human beings are cut off, the eyes are extracted, the feet and hands are severed, and the person, who was created in the image and likeness of God, is horribly deformed in contempt of his Creator.
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The author, Peter of Blois, was rather an adventurous career clergyman: after studying in Bologna and Paris, in 1166, he moved to Sicily, where he became tutor to King William II. As he was forced to leave the Kingdom of Sicily, he moved to France and then to England, where he was chancellor of the archbishop of Canterbury and eventually secretary of Queen Eleonora, who was widowed by King Henry II. Peter was therefore a prominent public figure, who knew well the ways of the society of his day. Nonetheless, he was first of all a cleric who was especially solicitous for the destiny of ecclesiastics like himself. As Albini (2016) pointed out:
The presence of collective misery appears, in various works [by Pietro di Blois], as a specter, as a danger to be avoided. The fear of a chaotic society emerges, a society in which family ties are lacking and disordered situations are created, that make begging necessary, thus giving rise to the presence of vagabonds, which he describes as deformed, ravenous, semihomuncoli (half-humans).
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The story of the man who stole to feed his family in any case touches a problem; this is not only a personal problem but also a general one, because it is an ethicalsocial problem: is it lawful to steal in case of extreme necessity? Pietro di Blois seemed to be inclined toward an affirmative answer, or at least he was scandalized by the practice, rather widespread not only in England at that time, of putting to death a thief caught red-handed, without taking into account the state of need that may have led him to steal. According to Peter of Blois, it is absurd that hares and deer of noble families are better protected by the law than the poor suffering from hunger. The case was studied by Huguccio Pisanus (1961) in a very interesting volume, which was titled as Les pauvres ont-ils des droits? (Tierney 1959) . This volume describes, in a comprehensive manner, the debate that took place between the mid-12th century and the middle of the next century about the lawfulness of theft in case of need. The obstacles that, for medieval authors, oppose the lawfulness of such behavior are immediately evident. The first obstacle is given by the biblical text; in Exodus 20:15, it is clearly said that "you will not steal," and the same command is repeated in Deuteronomy 5:19. It is a fundamental text for JudeoChristian tradition: the so-called Decalogue, that is, the 10 commandments that Moses received directly from God on Mount Sinai. The words of Exodus do not mention any kind of exceptions, and since they are words of "divine right," they are an almost insurmountable obstacle to the acceptance of any theft as lawful, albeit in conditions of extreme necessity. An attempt to overcome the problem is to observe that the poor person who resorts to theft to help his family survive does not intend to harm anyone, on the contrary, he only has the intention, in itself positive, to meet the needs of his loved ones. This reasoning is however opposed by a tradition that dates back to Augustine of Hippo, according to which every moral act cannot be evaluated on the basis of intentions, but only on the basis of objectivity. No good end justifies in itself an inherently evil act (Peter Lombard 1971) . 4 The solutions found by the clerics between the 12th and 13th centuries were different, depending on whether they were theologians or canonists. Theologians solved the problem by analyzing the condition of "extreme necessity." The solution was then to say that, in case of extreme necessity (such as during a drought, an earthquake, or other extreme situations), everything becomes common. Therefore, if the poor in case of extreme necessity take the possession of something 4 The reflection on intention is strictly tied to the anti-Abelard polemic, of which Lombard was a protagonist: Cf. that does not belong to them, they do not commit theft because that thing does not really belong to anyone in particular. This is the solution proposed, for example, by Thomas Aquinas (1886 -1906 :
Is it lawful to steal out of necessity? It would seem not. (Muller 1994) . In this sense, given that the definition of theft according to Roman law is the removal of a good of others against the will of the owner, one of the requirements that qualify the act as a crime is missing and therefore there is no theft.
The reflection on theft in case of necessity, as is evident, has been at the center of a complex analysis, which concerned the general layout of the societas christiana, i.e. the Christianity, as it was being configured between the 12th and 13th centuries (Capitani 1974) . (It was) quaedam confestim nominata convoluta sunt cum malitia, inter quae ponit furtum. Sed illud quod est secundum se malum non potest propter aliquem bonum finem bonum fieri. Ergo non potest aliquis licite furari ut necessitati suae subveniat.Praeterea, homo debet diligere proximum sicut seipsum. Sed non licet furari ad hoc quod aliquis per eleemosynam proximo subveniat; ut Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium. Ergo etiam non licet furari ad subveniendum propriae necessitati. Sed contra est quod in necessitate sunt omnia communia. Et ita non videtur esse peccatum si aliquis rem alterius accipiat, propter necessitatem sibi factam communem. Respondeo dicendum quod ea quae sunt iuris humani non possunt derogare iuri naturali vel iuri divino. Secundum autem naturalem ordinem ex divina providentia institutum, res inferiores sunt ordinatae ad hoc quod ex his subveniatur hominum necessitati. Et ideo per rerum divisionem et appropriationem, de iure humano procedentem, non impeditur quin hominis necessitati sit subveniendum ex huiusmodi rebus. Et ideo res quas aliqui superabundanter habent, ex naturali iure debentur pauperum sustentationi. Unde Ambrosius dicit, et habetur in decretis, dist. XLVII, esurientium panis est quem tu detines; nudorum indumentum est quod tu recludis; miserorum redemptio et absolutio est pecunia quam tu in terram defodis. Sed quia multi sunt necessitatem patientes, et non potest ex eadem re omnibus subveniri, committitur arbitrio uniuscuiusque dispensatio propriarum rerum, ut ex eis subveniat necessitatem patientibus. Si tamen adeo sit urgens et evidens necessitas ut manifestum sit instanti necessitati de rebus occurrentibus esse subveniendum, puta cum imminet personae periculum et aliter subveniri non potest; tunc licite potest aliquis ex rebus alienis suae necessitati subvenire, sive manifeste sive occulte sublatis. Nec hoc proprie habet rationem furti vel rapinae." an ethical-economic and ethical-political reflection, which naturally had important social implications. The protagonists of this reflection were clerics, that is, those intellectuals who, especially in Bologna (with the study of law) and in Paris (with theological reflection), were building the overall image of the society in which they lived. This reflection of the clerics was nourished in the texts of the first Christian centuries and in particular of the fourth-century doctrinal elaborations, transmitted in varied ways in the following centuries. For demonstrative reasons, the author would like to present the broad lines of this reflection around two large thematic groups, namely "the duties of the rich (Christophe 1964)," on the one hand, and "the rights of the poor," on the other hand.
Clement of Alexandria
The history of the relationship between Christianity and the rich is the object of study by historians, exegetes, and theologians. To give an idea of writings of the auctores, i.e. the Church Fathers, quoted by theologians and canonists of the 12th and 13th centuries, it will be enough to cite some points of reference. The first among them is Clement of Alexandria, the Greek author of the second century. His Quis dives salvetur?, i.e. Salvation for the Rich, is perhaps the first text entirely dedicated to a Christian ethical reflection on wealth. Faced with the opinions of those who considered wealth to be completely incompatible with being a Christian, Clement first affirmed that money, on its own, is neither good nor bad, but is an instrument in the hands of people:
An instrument if used skillfully, is skillful; if you are deficient in skill, it is affected by your lack of skill, being itself blameless. Wealth is such an instrument. If one uses it justly it is at the service of justice. If one uses it unjustly it is then at the service of injustice. For its nature is to be subservient, not to rule. We cannot then call to task that which of itself is neither good nor evil. (Of itself) it is not able to be a cause (of anything). Rather call to task that which has the power of using it well or badly.
And this thing is the human mind, which possesses both freedom of self-determination and free will in the use of what is assigned to it (Clement of Alexandria 1897).
Based on these considerations, Clement is the first to affirm:
So let no one throw away the riches which benefit also our neighbors. For they are in fact possessions, since they are possessed, and advantageous, inasmuch as they are useful and provided by God for the benefit of humankind; and (riches) are controlled and subjugated to us as material and instruments in order for those who understand it to make good use of it (Clement of Alexandria 1897).
He used here, for perhaps, the first time in history, the expression "the good use of wealth" -an expression that will have a long history in the subsequent writings.
Fourth-century turning point
A second milestone is represented by what has been described as the turning point of the fourth century. In that century, as everyone knows, by the decision of the emperor Constantine, Christianity first became religio licita, i.e. a lawful religion and then, with Theodosius, the official religion of the Roman Empire. 6 The turning point was not only religious or political, it was accompanied by a cultural turning point whose greatest representatives were the Cappadocian Fathers, who are well known as the great theologians of Greek patristics (Coulie 1985) . At a time when Christianity became the religion of the Emperor and of the whole empire, these bishops were able to exert a decisive influence on the political management of public affairs and on the social structure deriving from it. The fourth-century turning point was described by some eminent scholars as that of the transition from "euergetism," the civic beneficence, to "caritas," the Christian virtue that became a principle of action and social life (Patlagean 1977; Veyne 1976; Brown 2002, pp.6-9) .
To expose the differences between the two paradigms of euergetism and charity in simplified terms, we can say that the first difference concerns the recipients of social action: while the euergetism is addressed to all the citizens, regardless of their condition of need, charity is addressed to the poor, be they citizens or foreigners. A second difference concerns the actors of the deed: the euergeti were by definition owners, the privileged, so that they could legitimately expect the plausum, that is, as we can say today, a "reputational benefit." Charity instead has always been required for everyone, i.e., rich and poor, because everyone has the possibility to help in some way those who are worse off than they are, and charity, at least in the Gospel texts, does not provide plausum, but, on the contrary, "when you give alms, do not let your left hand know what your right is doing" (Mt 6:3) (Mara 1980 Basil of Caesarea is among the important protagonists of this turning point (Pizzolato 2013) . After a typical upper classes upbringing, with studies in Athens, Basil chose monastic life and practiced voluntary poverty. As an ordained priest, he demonstrated his new sensitivity to the poor after a recent famine. Brown (2002 Brown ( , 2012 described it as follows:
The Basil did what he could. In a series of sermons, he showed that he had not been educated in Athens to no purpose.
He knew how to "move the heart by the incantation of words." The sermons he preached on this occasion were unusually "classical" in style. He challenged the rich to act as euergetai to the poor. He promised them the acclamation of the entire demos of the angels in heaven! Basil's sermons, indeed, were intended to be the swansong of the ancient city. With an indignation rendered heavy with classical resonances, he pointed out to the urban facade of Caesarea. Decaying walls and buildings towered all around, "great cliffs of stone and marble," in which wealth that might have been spent on the poor was frozen in useless stone by the mad drive for "civic" fame! Eventually, the storehouses were opened. Basil used his own wealth to found a soup kitchen, and could be seen in it, directing his servants as they laid tables for the poor. He even embraced lepers with the kiss of peace! (Brown 2002, pp.39-40) .
Basil was among the first to use an "ancient" language, where it was well accepted by the rich of his time, because he reechoed the traditional themes of euereuer getism, i.e. the philanthropy, and plausum, i.e. the approval (even if angelic and not human), to introduce a new type of paradigm, that of caritas (Basil of Caesarea 1857).
These premises were widely developed by the Greek Patriarchs, and particularly by John Chrysostom, whose preaching on the subject of wealth led him to exile and finally to death away from the city of Constantinople, of which he had been the Patriarch (Faus 1991) .
Ambrose of Milan
Ambrose of Milan represents a third milestone in the development of duties of the rich in Christian writings. He has left a legacy of great importance in Western Christianity regarding these issues. The most significant contribution of Ambrose was on the common theme of the origin of goods. This theme has very important biblical roots. An important page of Ambrose's book On Naboth explains it very well:
How far, O rich, do you extend your irrational greed?
"Perhaps you alone dwell in the midst of the land?" (Is 5:8).
7 Why do you refuse the commonality of nature's goods and claim possession of them only for yourself? The earth was established in communion for all, for the rich and for the poor. Why do you claim for yourself alone the right to land ownership? Nature, which begets everyone poor, doesn't know the wealthy.
Nor are we born with clothing or begotten with gold and silver upon ourselves. Naked it brings us into the light (cf. Job 1:21), wanting food, clothing and drink, and naked the earth receives us whom it brought forth, not knowing how to compass our possessions in the tomb.
A small plot of land is more than enough for both the poor person and the rich one. The earth, which was not enough for the desires of the rich while they were alive, now contains them completely in little space. Moreover, nature cannot distinguish (rich or poor) when we are born, it does not know how to distinguish when we die. The principle that the earth is common for all people (in latin: commune omnibus... terra fundata est) is expressed very explicitly here. In reality, Ambrose was conscious that he was going beyond the Roman legal and philosophical tradition, as evidenced by a famous passage of De Officiis:
They (the philosophers) considered it just that one should treat as communal that which is communal, that is, public property as public, and that which is private (property) as private. But this is not even in accord with nature, for nature has given all things to everyone in common. Indeed, God has commanded that all things to be produced, so that there is nourishment for everyone, and that the earth should be in a certain sense a common possession. Nature, therefore, has produced a common right for all, but greed [usurpation] has made it a private right (Ambrose of Milan 1977, 132) .
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While Cicero considered consonant with justice the treating of communal things as communal and private things as private, that is the basic principle of nonappropriation for private use of public goods, Ambrose extended the idea of the common goods stating that "nature has poured forth all its gifts indiscriminately for everyone." God commanded that everything was produced so that food was common to all, and the earth was, in a certain sense, the property of all. Nature therefore created the common right, and usurpation (Usurpatio) constituted the private privilege. This idea has a biblical root, which is strongly expressed in Psalm 24:1 "The earth is the LORD's and all it holds, the world and those who dwell in it." 9 Ambrose conjoined this Judeo-Christian principle with the completely Latin idea of the communion of the goods of the earth in the state of nature. To do so, Ambrose went back to a myth very dear to the Latin tradition: that of the golden age. Brown (2002 Brown ( , 2012 It is clear, however, that while the myth of the Golden Age was ideally placed in a distant past the JudaicChristian idea of a God as the only effective holder of the possession of all things is a current idea. It is therefore evident that Ambrose made instrumental use of the myth to introduce an idea that, potentially, could be perceived as subversive.
Western monasticism
The fourth step in the elaboration of Christian writing on the subject of wealth is represented by early medieval monasticism. The contribution of these authors, with their common life in spaces separated from the rest of the society, monasteries, relates to "common use of property." While Ambrose had solemnly affirmed the "common origin of goods," here created the concrete case of a community of men (more rarely of women) who practiced the "common use" of goods. The passage (that becomes the) starting point of this practice is represented by the Acts of the Apostles, which describes the -idealized? -way of life of the first Christian community in Jerusalem: "All who believed were together and had all things in common; they would sell their property and possessions and divide them among all according to each one's need" (Acts 2: 44-45). This text was strengthened, in the same Book of Acts, by another passage, in chapter IV:
The community of believers was of one heart and mind, and no one claimed that any of his possessions was his own, but they had everything in common. With great power the apostles bore witness to the resurrection of the Lord Jesus, and great favor was accorded them all. There was no needy person among them, for those who owned property or houses would sell them, bring the proceeds of the sale, and put them at the feet of the apostles, and they were distributed to each according to need. (Acts 4: 32-35)
The monk, entering the monastery, renounced the personal possession of all his goods, which were distributed to the poor or given to the monastery itself. The
Rule of the Master in this regard provided that
When the abbot has at his disposal these goods [those of the new brother], having satisfied the needs of the monastery everything that will seem superfluous, will be sold and the equivalent price will be distributed to the poor on behalf of the soul of the brother himself who gave them, so that what the ignorant brother could not complete, the abbot, as a learned master, could perform in his name (Regula Magistri 1965) .
In this way, the goods offered to the monastery became a sacred property. Benedict's rule arrived to invite the monastery's cellarer to "regard all utensils and goods of the monastery as sacred vessels of the altar" (Regula Benedicti 1972). As Todeschini pointed out:
A patrimony can be understood as sacred starting with the sacredness of the life of those who run it and the whole managerial dimension concerning this property, the whole tangible reality of this patrimony, up to the trivial practicality of the things useful to table, bed, clothes, daily well-being, can be included in this process of sacralization (Todeschini 2002, p.30 ).
The consequences are illustrated by Todeschini himself:
From the sixth to the tenth centuries, in the Mediterranean West, the place occupied by the church or by the monastery is therefore the place, of a prodigious alchemy:
it is here that the materiality of wealth is transformed for the first time from an idol of greed to an organized sacred patrimony, from a private treasure it is changed into a public substance which can have an ordered, mathematic administration (Todeschini 2002, p.35; Weber 1991, p.382 ).
The word that best expresses this new awareness is caritas, which is understood not only as the sentiment that unites the monks with each other and with God but also as the virtue that presides over the proper use of goods and their administration on behalf of the poor. The opposite of caritas is avaritia, which is understood as a possession that divides, separates, and therefore prevents the collective growth of goods. This doctrine, elaborated by the clerics, had its first, important, juridical expression in that collection known as the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, in which there is a text attributed to Pope Clement I, who said that
The common use of all the things that are in the world must be allowed to everyone, but because of iniquity, someone says something is his own and someone else says something else is of him. Thus, the division between mortals was created […] But just as neither the air nor the splendor of the sun can be divided, so also the other things, which have been given to all people to be possessed collectively, must not be divided but shared in common.
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Eleventh-century reform
The final step to understand Western Christian writing on theft in case of need is represented by the "Gregorian Reform" of the 11th century. Indeed, it is at this time that the monastic model is imposed on all of Christendom, and the parameters used to sacralize the possessions of the monasteries are used to sacralize the whole world. Continuing to use the words of Todeschini, we recalled that The so-called 11th-century reform can be represented as the moment when monastic ecclesiology (particularly Cluny's ecclesiology) was applied to the whole of Christianity. The model of the monk, celibate, poor, and unarmed, became more clearly the model of every cleric. We can say that, in the traditional tripartite division of society, in oratores, bellatores, and laboratores, in the 11th century it was the first group, the men of prayer and word, that is, the clerics, who eventually imposed their power over all others, as much on the bellatores, namely on the aristocratic warrior class, as on the laboratores, that is, on all the men and women whose life was marked by labor which is to say by fatigue.
In addition, clerics applied the monastic economic lexicon, caritas, to all of Christianity. With this procedure, they gave themselves the task of establishing the lawfulness of everyone's earnings and possessions. Beginning with the debate on simony, that is, on the value of spiritual and ecclesiastical goods, they ended up focusing on an elaborate doctrine on usury, which in fact was regarded as any use of money not aimed at the growth of caritas, specifically of the common good of the societas christiana.
Gratian's Concordia
This brings us to the moment in which, between the 12th and 13th centuries, clerics focused on the problem of theft in case of need, 11 apparently, a minor issue compared to those of simony and usury, but one that made a great impact in the subsequent debate. The conditions for the clarification of the topic of theft in case of need must be sought in the great foundational work, done by Gratian with his Concordia discordantium canonum of 1140, that marks the beginings of the church law (Tierney 1959) . Although Gratian never explicitly addressed the issue of the theft in case of need, there are the auctoritates in the Concordia which will later be used by specialists to determine this concrete case. We can mention some significant passages.
A first important theme developed in the Concordia concerns the issue of the communion possession of goods Gratian quotes Pseudo-Clement's letter contained in the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals. He's speaking about the common life of the clergy, by which he intended to extend the monastic ideal of the communion of goods. In so doing, Gratian widened the typical monastic ideal of common possession of the monastery's goods to promote the idea of communion possession of all goods of creation. It is important to underline that the auctoritas was attributed by the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals and therefore also by Gratian to one of the early pontiffs and therefore it enjoyed great authority. It is useful to reread the text, as also reported in Gratian's Concordia:
In fact, the use of all the things that are in the world is a common right and must be allowed to all people.
However, because of iniquity, some claim something as their own and someone else says something else is theirs. In this way division among mortals was created.
11 The debate around the issue of theft in the event of extreme necessity has been explained in an egregious way by Couvreur cit. note 2, which is described in this paper in essential phases.
Eventually a very wise Greek man, knowing that things were this way, affirmed: things held among friends must always be for common use. Even spouses undoubtedly hold everything in common. He adds, "Just as neither the air nor the splendor of the sun can be divided, so too all other things, which have been given to humans to possess them together, must not be divided but shared in common."
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Second theme is the comparation between the refusal of help and the murder. Starting with the idea of the original common ownership of all things, the Concordia intended to focus on the duties of those who possessed these things. In the first place, Gratian quotes some Church Father equating the refusal to help the hungry to the murder. The first quotation was attributed by Gratian to Ambrose, but in reality, it was a homily of Pope Leo the great: "Feed those who die of hunger. In fact, you kill anyone you could keep alive by feeding, if you do not feed them." 13 Gratian continued with a text by Caesarius of Arles, which he attributed to Augustine: "those who do not give tithes will be accused of murder before the supreme court of God for all the poor in the their homeland who will die of hunger." (Caesarius of Arles 1953, 146) 14 . Third theme is the comparation between the refusal of help and the steal. Gratian compared the refusal to help the hunger not only to murder but also to steal. He quoted an important text:
Again Ambrose (Serm. LXXXI) on what we read in the Gospel (Luke 12:16): "There was a rich man whose land produced a bountiful harvest …" Just as those who are mentally confused due to madness and do not see real things, but rather the fantasies of their passion, so also the mind of misers is sometimes narrowed by the bonds 12 Decretum Gratiani, ca 12, q.1, c.2; Dilectissimis (CIC 676s):
"Communis enim usus omnium, que sunt in hoc mundo, omnibus hominibus esse debuit. Sed per iniquitatem alius hoc dixit esse suum, et alius istud et sic inter mortales facta est diuisio. §. 2. Denique Grecorum quidam sapientissimus, hec ita esse sciens, communia debere, ait, esse amicorum omnia. In omnibus autem sunt sine dubio et coniuges. "Et sicut non potest," inquit, "diuidi aer, neque splendor solis, ita nec reliqua, que communiter omnibus data sunt ad habendum, diuidi debere, sed habenda esse communia. It is a long quote from a homily that Gratian believed to be Ambrose's. Lio (1952 Lio ( , 1955 showed that it is actually taken from a homily by Basil, 16 which got to Gratian through Rufinus's Latin translation. 17 This translation was inserted during the early Middle Ages in some ancient collection of Ambrose's homilies and that is why Gratian attributed it to the Bishop of Milan. 18 The text clearly compares theft by the indigent who in a state of necessity take what belongs to someone else to the theft of those who, possessing goods in abundance, deny them to the indigent who are in need. This reflection led to debates among the Decretists. Some of them wondered if the statement was not simply rhetorical excess. Rufinus for example concluded that the statement must be taken seriously, and therefore the crime of the rich who refuses to help is more serious, but only in the case that the indigent is in serious danger of death.
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It is through this reflection that the Decretists elaborate the concept of "extreme necessity," to understand a state of need that is life-threatening (Rufinus 1902, 111) .
On the other hand, Gratian also opened the way for reflection concerning the rights of the poor. He quoted, for example, some auctoritas concerning the state of necessity. In the chapter Discipulos of the De consecratione he recalled that Christ had declared innocent the apostles, who, driven by hunger, had eaten some ears of corn. 20 In the same distinction, there is also an axiom, which Gratian attributed to Pope Felix IV, but which actually goes back to the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals: necessitas non habet legem (Corpus iuris canonici [1879] [1880] [1881] 301 23 Huguccio, Summa, Praefatio Decreti, p.11: "cum dicitur iure naturali omnia sunt communia, non excluditur proprium, nec dicitur commune contrarium proprii, sed is est sensus : iurc naturali, id est iudicio rationis approbante, omnia sunt communia, id est tempore necessitatis indigentibus communicanda. Naturali enim ductu rationis approbamus nobis tantum necessaria retinere, reliqua proximis indigentibus debere distribuere. Que interpretatio colligitur ex verbis Ieronimi, D. 42, § 1, verb. Aliena, rapere convincitur qui ultra necessaria sibi retinere probatur; aliena dico, id est aliis tempore necessitatis communicanda. -et ex verbis Ambrosii, D. 47, Sicus hii, ut nemo dicat proprium quod est commune, id est tantum propriis usibus concessum quod tempore necessitatis est aliis communicandum." 24 Huguccio, Summa, 4° Ad D. 47, c. 8. "Sed cum in hoc capitulo et in multis aliis locis dicatur quod omnia nostra preter necessaria sint aliena, id est aliis scilicet pauperibus, communicanda, et sepe dicatur quod sint eorum, queritur an pauperes ordine iudicario possint illa petere si negentur. Resp. Non, quia non sunt eorum, licet dicantur esse Huguccio retained the fundamental principle of private property, whose respect is essential to the legal system, according to the tradition of Roman jurists, but he combined it with the principle of the necessary sharing of goods, limiting it to the case of extreme necessity. His final statement that the sharing of goods in time of need falls under the Gospel precept has important consequences. In the grouping of Christian people into clerics and laities, which became current in the 12th century thanks to Gratian's Concordia, clerics were also required to observe the evangelical counsels, while the laities were only required to observe the precepts. To affirm that the sharing of goods is a precept means to say that not only the clerics but also all the laities are held to observe it. It was still necessary to justify the fact that the poor man, taking possession of something of another person, although in a situation of extreme necessity, went explicitly against the biblical precept: "you will not steal." Huguccio's solution was, in many respects, brilliant: he used the definition of theft elaborated by Roman jurists. In the Corpus Iuris Civilis, Huguccio could read Gaius's definition according to which theft is in general the crime of someone who takes the possession of something of another, without the consent of the owner (invito domino) (Corpus Iuris Civilis, ed. Krueger 1892-1895, 147).
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The very clause invite domino, allowed for rereading the case of theft in case of extreme necessity. Huguccio put the case of a poor person in dire need who takes someone else's possession, while the owner is absent. Given the precept of the sharing of goods in case of need, the poor could legitimately think that the owner, if present, would have gladly donated the thing needed; therefore, Huguccio concluded that 
